

Department of Economics
2025-2026
Seminar Series



Monday, September 8, 2025
12:30 PM - 1:50 PM
SBS, Room N603

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Bonn

Fully Self-Justifiable Outcomes

Abstract: We introduce full self-justifiability, a solution concept that significantly strengthens the notion of justifiability (McLennan, 1985). An outcome is fully self-justifiable if it is supported by justifiable equilibria regardless of the order in which actions implausible under the given outcome are excluded. We show that this concept has strong selection power: fully self-justifiable outcomes are consistent with both justifiable equilibria (McLennan, 1985) and forward induction equilibria (Cho, 1987); furthermore, in signaling games, they are universally divine (Banks and Sobel, 1987) and satisfy the Intuitive Criterion, D1, and D2 (Cho and Kreps, 1987). Moreover, we establish that sequentially stable outcomes (Dilmé, 2024) are fully self-justifiable. Thus, fully self-justifiable outcomes always exist, and full self-justifiability provides a stronger foundation for the study of stable behavior.

All in-person seminars will be held in the Social and Behavioral Sciences Building, Room N603. For additional information, contact the seminar organizers: Profs. Jonathan Becker and Lorenz Ekerdt. Visit our webpage for additional information: stonybrook.edu/economics.

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